{"id":12976,"date":"2011-09-20T16:22:20","date_gmt":"2011-09-20T20:22:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/2011\/09\/20\/foreign-aid-a-fillip-for-development-or-a-fuel-for-corruption\/"},"modified":"2011-09-20T16:22:20","modified_gmt":"2011-09-20T16:22:20","slug":"foreign-aid-a-fillip-for-development-or-a-fuel-for-corruption","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/en\/2011\/09\/20\/foreign-aid-a-fillip-for-development-or-a-fuel-for-corruption\/","title":{"rendered":"Foreign Aid \u2013 A Fillip for Development or a Fuel for Corruption?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>ABSTRACT:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds which are otherwise used to provide productive public goods and services. Our main results may be summarized as follows: (1) corruption impedes economic development and compromises the effectiveness of aid programmers; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development process and the donation of aid; (3) foreign aid is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.<\/p>\n<div class='w3eden'><!-- WPDM Link Template: Default Template -->\n\n<div class=\"link-template-default card mb-2\">\n    <div class=\"card-body\">\n        <div class=\"media\">\n            <div class=\"mr-3 img-48\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"wpdm_icon\" alt=\"Icon\"   src=\"https:\/\/inesad.edu.bo\/wp-content\/plugins\/download-manager\/assets\/file-type-icons\/pdf.png\" \/><\/div>\n            <div class=\"media-body\">\n                <h3 class=\"package-title\"><a href='https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/download\/working-paper-n-092011\/'>Working Paper N\u00b0 09\/2011<\/a><\/h3>\n                <div class=\"text-muted text-small\"><i class=\"fas fa-copy\"><\/i> 1 file(s) <i class=\"fas fa-hdd ml-3\"><\/i> 447 KB<\/div>\n            <\/div>\n            <div class=\"ml-3\">\n                <a class='wpdm-download-link download-on-click btn btn-primary ' rel='nofollow' href='#' data-downloadurl=\"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/download\/working-paper-n-092011\/?wpdmdl=1945&refresh=69e4dd0f5ff9a1776606479\">Download<\/a>\n            <\/div>\n        <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>ABSTRACT: We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[255,523,45,167,470,189,490,432],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12976","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","","category-macroeconomia","category-macroeconomics","category-documentos","category-gonzalo-forgues-puccio","category-gonzalo-forgues-puccio-2","category-keith-blackburn","category-keith-blackburn-2","category-working-papers"],"acf":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p9wqBX-3ni","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12976","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12976"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12976\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12976"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12976"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.inesad.edu.bo\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12976"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}