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Finding rationality where less expected
By
Joaquín Morales*,
La Paz, 11 June 2007.
Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner’s excellent and
bestselling book Freakonomics
(1)
has been considered a witty and simple way to vulgarize economic
theory, by translating into prose Levitt’s formal work on crime,
drug dealing, politics and others. Levitt, who in 2003 won the
John Bates Clark Medal given by the American Economic
Association to the best American economist under forty, defines
himself as a “rogue economist exploring the hidden side of
everything”.
The principle of Freakonomics consists in simply applying the
rational utility-maximization paradigm of microeconomics to
unconventional subjects, usually not considered by “traditional”
economists. Using the powerful tools that economics provide,
Levitt tries (quite successfully) to find the rational
explanation for observed and unexplained phenomena, usually
assumed as “irrational”, “coincidences” or simply
“unexplainable”. Explanations often lie behind one of the basic
definitions of economics: it’s the analysis of what motivates
people and which means they use to get what they want.
Why is this interesting for the case of Bolivia? Several times
we’ve heard and even said ourselves that a good share of the
Bolivian population acts irrationally, that "logic does not
operate higher than 2500 meters over the sea level", that
cultural differences make Andean mentalities incompatible with
the concepts of the marginalistic revolution or more
romantically, that Latin-American Magic Realism dictates the way
things work in this continent.
This is all wrong for so many reasons. First of all, what seems
to be irrational behaviour happens all around the planet, it
does not discriminate like the FIFA does. Secondly, he who says
that Andean mentalities and marginalistic maximization are
incompatible has never been to Mercado Rodriguez nor to a
microeconomics lecture. Finally, Magic Realism was invented by
German painters, which is not only an oxymoron, but proves that
rationality does operate in magical contexts.
Indeed, removing the rationality hypothesis is simply removing
any justification for economic analysis, because this assumption
is the corner stone for all economic reasoning. If indeed
Bolivians were irrational, we should lay-off right now all those
expensive economists and hire an army of sociologists of
cultural determinism.
So what does motivate Bolivians? let´s look closer to a very
precise example of everyday life in Bolivia. The Entrada del
Gran Poder is a patronal mixed catholic-folkloric parade,
where devotees express their faith by dancing and drinking
during several hours wearing sumptuous and expensive costumes.
Sadly the lack of empirical data or time to gather it makes of
the following example pure speculation, but it might be
interesting to push the exam further.
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What would explain the fact that incredibly large sums of
hardly-won money, not only by Bolivian but by any standard,
could be spent in 12 to 48 hours in costumes, dancing and
drinking? Up to 1000 USD could be spent on a "moreno"
costume, which is similar to any very bourgeois
European expenditure level per hour celebrated, without counting
the drinks. And obviously, by Bolivian standards it's a hell of
a lot of money. Skeptics would consider this expenditure as an
unforgivable waste in such a poor country, an offence to morale
and good manners while wasting the whole year's family effort on
one massive spree. The more naive would consider it as a proof
of devotion to the Señor del Gran Poder: this is
obviously false when we compare the miserable amount of charity
given to the Church of El Gran Poder to the impressive
level of selfish expenditures on bright costumes and boxes of
beer.
So what would justify such an important investment both in
money, effort and time?
In reality it’s all about signaling, like economists would say,
about revealing types in contexts of moral hazard and adverse
selection
(2).
Indeed, no matter what moralists would say, someone who dances
12 hours straight with a 40 kg costume on his shoulders while
drinking under La Paz hot winter sun is signaling anything but
laziness. This reveals the level of effort that a person can
provide, solving issues of moral hazard. The system quickly
discriminates the “bad” types from the “good” types, which is an
important signaling in the labor market, in the marriage market
and in the prestige market.
But the most important signaling comes from the money invested
on costumes and beer. It quickly reveals if the agent is or not
stingy, dependable, has good relationships with other trustful
agents (moral hazard) and above all if he is solvent (adverse
selection). Most dancing groups (comparsas) are organized around
one corporation, or association of people working in the same
commercial sector: the Comparsas work more as Unions than groups
of devotees to the Señor del Gran Poder. So, the revelation of
types in each comparsa is indeed an investment because it
allows signaling to potential commercial partners, credit
lenders, investors and others, who's worth dealing with and
who's not.
Contrary to Akerlof’s market for lemons
(3),
here good types drive bad types out of the market, because
information flows from everywhere: the system creates a
transparent market. This degree of transparency would be hardly
reachable in a non-Gran Poder context or other kind of
folkloric manifestation, because there is not like in Occident an
everyday signaling system by dress codes, arranged houses or
other ostentatious goods. This implies that the studied market
needs some updates, which explains the frequency of folkloric
parades, requires innovation on costumes, music and dance-steps:
this confers the folkloric prestige market a dynamic feature. In
every manifestation, but mostly at the Gran Poder parade,
signals of who has prospered, who has become more reliable and
who has lost prestige are given.
But,
like in any informational market, some agents might have
incentives to “cheat”, by signaling a “high type” investing more
than what they have the possibility to (by borrowing for the
costume). This is not necessarily cheating, because most
investments are financed by credits, so investing on prestige
for a not-necessarily solvent agent can make him an interesting
commercial partner in spite of everything. But the system is
merciless, because it’s dynamic. Every year agents have to renew
investments, update the level of prestige capital, and signal
innovation, modernity and adaptation. The cheating type could
hardly afford to renew loss making investments every year, thus
in time the bad types would be driven out of the market.
However, what is interesting is that types can change from year
to year (because it is a mix between moral hazard and adverse
selection): in one year they can change their level of effort
and can become more or less prosperous. The system is highly
incentive compatible, because by inciting higher levels of
effort, it grants important rewards in prestige levels.
As I
said before, this theory is purely speculative and lack any
empirical support. But this phenomenon moves several hundreds
of thousands of dollars every year, provides qualified and
creative jobs for artisans and is an important cultural event.
So it's worth analysing if in fact the Gran Poder is more
beneficial than costly for society, following the argument that
it brings transparency to the popular commercial zones in La
Paz. To measure this could prove to be a hard task: we could try
to estimate if the rate of transactions and new contracts
increase in the weeks following the parade, but this effect
could be countered by the fact that households endure important
expenditures before and during the parade, limiting their
commercial potentialities in the short run.
Nevertheless, the point I want to make is that probably there is
something else behind all these expenditures, than just
folklore. Like Levitt, the new generation of economist will
probably have to analyse more unconventional subjects to have a
better understanding of the world that surrounds them. By
leaving prejudice aside, we might discover that people is more
logical and rational than expected.
(*) Visiting Student/Researcher at the Institute for Advanced
Development Studies, La Paz, Bolivia. The author happily
receives comments at the following e-mail:
jsmoralesb@gmail.com.
(1)Steven
D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist
Explores the Hidden Side of Everything, 2005,
Published by William Morrow
(2)
Jacques Laffont and David Mortimort, The Theory of Incentives:
the Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press
(3)George
A. Akerlof,
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3
(Aug., 1970), pp. 488-500
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Institute for Advanced Development Studies 2006.
The opinions expressed in this newsletter are those of the
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